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Abstract
We study the complexity of bribery in a network-based rat-
ing system, where individuals are connected in a social net-
work and an attacker, typically a service provider, can influ-
ence their rating and increase the overall profit. We derive a
number of algorithmic properties of this framework, in par-
ticular we show that establishing the existence of an optimal
manipulation strategy for the attacker is NP-complete, even
with full knowledge of the underlying network structure.
1 Introduction
The widespread use of online rating systems has given rise to
the problem of how we might guarantee their reliability. The
emergence of recommender systems (Bobadilla et al. 2013),
as platforms that construct (often learning-based) protocols
to match users and provide accurate suggestions, is one such
effort to address this issue.
Meanwhile, research in artificial intelligence, in particu-
lar the fields of mechanism design, algorithmic game the-
ory and computational social choice, has been paying in-
creased attention to the strategic actions of decision-makers,
studying notions such as manipulation and truthfulness for
collective decision making, and coming up with formal re-
quirements for those properties to be realised. Surprisingly
though, as also noted in Tennenholtz (2008) and Alon et al.
(2015), there is a lack of formal study of what guarantees
are needed for recommendation systems to be reliable, an
observation which can be extended to rating systems in gen-
eral. Users’ evaluations can be carefully screened, and obvi-
ous biases (e.g., ethinicity-based discrimination) can be de-
tected, but no theoretical guarantee is provided on whether a
rating-system effectively discourages manipulation.
In a recent paper, Grandi and Turrini (2016) proposed
a network-based rating system and assessed the effect of
bribery, a well known and studied form of manipulation (for
a recent survey see, e.g., Faliszewski and Rothe, 2016), in
comparison with classical rating systems such as the one
used by the popular Tripadvisor R© website. In their model,
customers’ decision-making is formed by aggregating the
opinions of their peers — their personalised rating — and
an external service provider can give incentives to customers
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to modify their rating, potentially increasing the overall ex-
pected revenue. They demonstrate the fundamental effect of
uncertainty in preventing manipulation, in particular show-
ing that the personalised rating system is (optimally) manip-
ulable if the attacker has full knowledge of the underlying
network and even, as is common in real-world rating sys-
tems, when a number of users do not express any opinion.
However, nothing is said about the computational diffi-
culty of carrying out such an operation. Even when a system
is manipulable in theory, this might for instance require the
solution of a complex combinatorial problem. Understand-
ing the practical barriers to manipulation is therefore an im-
portant challenge and it can lead to a major validation of a
system only studied in theory.
In this paper we follow the standard approach of compu-
tational voting theory, which has shown that even if strategy-
proof voting rule cannot be designed, as a consequence
of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard 1973; Sat-
terthwaite 1975), some voting rules exists that are safe
against manipulation in practice, as computing manipulation
strategies is NP-hard (see, e.g., Conitzer and Walsh, 2016).
Contribution. We show that even if a personalised rating
system is manipulable in theory, the problem of manipulat-
ing it is intractable in practice. In particular, we establish
that even when the attacker has full knowledge of the net-
work the problem of determining the existence of a manip-
ulation strategy guaranteeing at least a given reward — and,
notably, an optimal one — is NP-complete. We do so by giv-
ing a polynomial-time reduction from the problem of finding
an independent set of a given size k in a 3-regular graph.
Related Literature Although our focus is personalised
rating, first introduced in Grandi and Turrini (2016), there
are a number of relevant approaches that have close connec-
tions to our work. First and foremost, Conitzer et al. (2010),
Bu (2013), Todo and Conitzer (2013) and Brill et al. (2016),
who study the effect of adding fake profiles to a social net-
work, a closely related problem to that of bribery. As already
pointed at previously, an extremely relevant line of research
is the work of Alon et al. (2015) and Lev and Tennenholtz
(2017), who looks at theoretical guarantees for group rec-
ommendations, as well as papers that have looked at social
network-based recommendations, such as (Andersen et al.
2008). See also the recent survey by Grandi (2017) for rele-
vant literature on the interplay between mechanisms for col-
lective choice and social networks. Finally, trust and repu-
tation have been central topics in the multi-agent systems
community (Conte and Paolucci 2002; Sabater and Sierra
2005; Garcin, Faltings, and Jurca 2009), and here we study
the computational aspects of their manipulation.
Paper organisation. In Section 2 we introduce the basic
definitions of personalised ratings and bribing strategies. In
Section 3 we show basic results on bribing strategies, and
in Section 4 we show our main result, which establishes
the NP-completeness of computing an optimal bribing strat-
egy and of deciding the possibility for successful manipula-
tion. Section 5 concludes the paper. Due to space constraints,
some of the proofs have been omitted.
2 Personalised Rating
In this section, we collect all the preliminary notions and
definitions from Grandi and Turrini (2016) needed to estab-
lish our results.
Evaluations and Rating
The framework we will be working on consists of an ab-
stract object r, called restaurant, and a finite set of individ-
uals C = {c1, ..., cn}, called customers. Customers are con-
nected in an undirected graph E ⊆ C × C, intuitively their
social network. For each c ∈ C, the neighbourhood of c is
defined to be N(c) = {x ∈ C : (c, x) ∈ E}, with the re-
quirement that c ∈ N(c), ∀c ∈ C, i.e., every customer is
connected to themself.
Customers concurrently submit an evaluation of the
restaurant, which is modelled as an element from the set
V al ∪ {∗}; where V al ⊆ [0, 1] and the distinguished ele-
ment ∗ represents the evaluation of a customer with no opin-
ion. Note that a property of the chosen set V al is that it is
closed under the operation min{1, x+y} for all x, y ∈ V al
(where min{1, ∗} = ∗ and x+ ∗ = ∗+ x for all x ∈ V al).
Most known rating methods, for example a discrete rating
scale of one to five stars, can be mapped onto the interval
[0, 1] and analysed within this framework. The evaluations
provided by customers thus take the form of an evaluation
function eval : C → V al ∪ {∗}.
Some or possibly all of the customers can express an opin-
ion on the restaurant, and those who do are called voters,
forming the set V ⊆ C where V = {c ∈ C : eval(c) 6= ∗}.
The set of voters is always assumed to be non-empty.
In contrast with what is typically proposed in this setting,
i.e., defining the rating of the restaurant as the average rat-
ing expressed by all the customers C, Grandi and Turrini
(2016) proposed a personalised version in which each cus-
tomer would be shown the average rating expressed by her
own neighbours. Formally, fixing a network E, and given
eval and c ∈ C, the expression P-rating(c, eval), i.e., the
personalised rating of customer c under evaluation eval , is
defined as follows:
P-rating(eval , c) = avg
k∈N(c)∩V
(eval(k)),
with the additional assumption that every customer of the
network is connected to at least one voter.
Utility and Bribing Strategies
Intuitively, individuals’ personalised ratings indicate their
propensity to use the service, in our case their propensity
to go to the restaurant. It is assumed, therefore, that the
actual utility a restaurant receives is proportional to the
rating that it is given by the customers, formally u0
P
=∑
c∈C P-rating(eval, c). This is a simplified setup, which
can be generalised by assuming a linear correlation between
the observed rating and the probability to use the service,
without affecting the conclusions of this paper.
At the initial stage of the game, the restaurant owner re-
ceives u0
P
and can decide to invest part of it to influence
a subset of customers and improve upon the initial situa-
tion. Such an investment is referred to as a bribing strat-
egy. Formally, it is a function σ : C → V al such that∑
c∈C σ(c) ≤ u0P. The latter constraint imposes that the
strategy is budget-balanced, i.e., the service provider can-
not reinvest more than the profit guaranteed by u0
P
. The set
of all strategies is referred to as Σ and σ0 is defined to be the
strategy that assigns 0 to all customers. A bribing strategy is
any strategy different from σ0.
The evaluation evalσ(c), i.e., the customers’ evaluation
after the execution of a strategy σ, is defined as evalσ(c) =
min{1, eval(c)+σ(c)}, where ∗+σ(c) = σ(c), if σ(c) 6= 0,
and ∗ + σ(c) = ∗, if σ(c) = 0. We can again relax this as-
sumption by assuming that the effect of a bribe is linearly
correlated to the new evaluation given by a customer, with-
out affecting our results. A strategy is said to be efficient if
σ(c) + eval(c) ≤ 1 for all c ∈ C.
The change in utility due to the execution of a strategy σ
is defined as
uσ
P
=
∑
c∈C
P-rating(evalσ, c)−
∑
c∈C
σ(c),
where P-rating(evalσ, c) is the P-rating of customer c
calculated with the new evaluation evalσ .
Strategies can be more or less rewarding for the attacker.
Let σ be a strategy. The revenue of σ is defined as rP(σ) =
uσ
P
−u0
P
. σ is profitable if rP(σ) > 0. Moreover, we say that
a strategy σ is optimal if uσ
P
≥ uσ′
P
for all σ′ ∈ Σ. Finally,
a network-based rating system is said to be bribery-proof if
σ0 is optimal.
Example 1. Consider three customers c1, c2, c3, with
eval(c1) = eval(c2) = 0.5 and eval(c3) = ∗,
and such that E = {(c1, c2), (c2, c3)}. We have
that P-rating(eval, c1) = P-rating(eval, c2) =
P-rating(eval, c3) = 0.5, u0P = 1.5. Let σ be such
that σ(c1)=0.5 and σ(c2)=σ(c3)=0. Such strategy is bud-
get balanced, but is such that P-rating(evalσ, c1) =
P-rating(evalσ, c2) = 0.75 and P-rating(evalσ, c3) =
0.5, therefore uσ
P
= 2, so, subtracting the expenses, rP(σ) =
0. This is true for every strategy that bribes only A by
less than 0.5, while the revenue is negative if the bribe
is strictly higher, as it would end up wasting utility. Con-
sider now σ′ such that σ′(c3)=0.5 and σ′(c2)=σ′(c1)=0. In
this case P-rating(evalσ
′
, c1) = P-rating(evalσ
′
, c2) =
P-rating(evalσ
′
, c3)=0.5 and therefore uσ
′
=1.5. How-
ever rP(σ)= − 0.5, as we spent 0.5 to influence C.
However, each strategy σ∗ bribing only c2 up to 0.5
yields a strictly positive revenue. In particular σ∗(c2)=0.5
and σ∗(c3)=σ∗(c1)=0 is the only optimal strategy, with
P-rating(evalσ
∗
, c1) = 0.75 = P-rating(evalσ
∗
, c2)
and P-rating(evalσ
∗
, c3) = 1, which means uσ
∗
= 2.5
and rP(σ∗) = 0.5.
Bribery-Proofness
As shown by Grandi and Turrini (2016), when the positions
of the individuals on the network are known, and in the
absence of non-voters, P-rating is not bribery-proof, and
an algorithm can be devised to compute an optimal bribing
strategy. This is however only shown for the rather unre-
alistic case in which all customers give an opinion of the
restaurant, by providing an example of a profitable bribing
strategy. Within this paper, we study the more general and
realistic case where a subset of customers might choose not
to provide any evaluation.
3 Bribes under the P-rating
In this section, and in the rest of the paper, we consider the
case in which the service provider has complete knowledge
of the customers’ network but where some of the customers
do not vote. The service provider is allowed to bribe a sub-
set of all of the customers. We denote this case non-voters
and known locations (NVKL). More formally, the service
provider receives a network (C,E) and an evaluation eval
as input, which also determines the subset V ⊂ C of cus-
tomers who have voted.
The effect of bribing a voter is intuitively simpler, as E ∩
V × V is not affected by evaluation updates. When bribing
a non-voter though, the set of voters itself might change.
So one might think that the order in which customers’ are
bribed plays a significant role in the rating’s manipulation.
However, we show next that this is not the case, as sequences
of bribes can be decomposed into atomic ones, independent
of their order. Proofs are omitted in the interest of space.
Single Bribes
We begin by considering the revenue gained by (efficiently)
bribing a solo voter x ∈ V :1
Proposition 1. Let V ⊆ C, let x ∈ V , and let σ be an effi-
cient bribing strategy such that σ(x) = b > 0 and σ(y) = 0,
for all y ∈ C\{x}. For each y ∈ N(x), set νy = |N(x)∩V |.
The revenue gained is
b
[( ∑
y∈N(x)
1
νy
)
− 1
]
.
We then move to computing the revenue gained by (effi-
ciently) bribing a solo non-voter x ∈ C \ V :
Proposition 2. Let V ⊆ C give rise to an evaluation eval,
let x ∈ C \V , and let σ be an efficient bribing strategy such
that σ(x) = b > 0 and σ(y) = 0, for all y ∈ C \ {x}. For
each y ∈ N(x), set νy = |N(y)∩V |. The revenue gained is
1This result is a reformulation of Proposition 12 from previous
work by (Grandi and Turrini 2016).
b
∑
y∈N(x)
(
1
νy + 1
− 1|N(x)|
)
−
∑
y∈N(x)
(
1
νy(νy + 1)
∑
k∈N(y)∩V
eval(k)
)
.
Proposition 1 shows us that for some fixed amount, the ex-
tent to which a voter is profitable to bribe can be expressed as
a function of only the network structure (by this we refer to
the topology of the network and the positions of non-voters
on the network). Contrary to this, we see by Proposition 2
that in order to express the extent to which a non-voter is
profitable to bribe, we require the evaluation of the network
as well as its structure.
Independence of Bribing Order
We now explore how the order of bribing customers impacts
the resulting revenue.
Proposition 3. Let V ⊆ C give rise to an evaluation eval,
let x, x′ ∈ C \ V be distinct non-voters, and let σ be an
efficient strategy such that σ(x) = b > 0, σ(x′) = b′ > 0,
and σ(y) = 0, for all y ∈ C \ {x, x′}. No matter whether
we bribe x before x′ or x′ before x, the resulting cumulative
revenue will be the same.
Now we consider the case where we compare bribing a
non-voter x and then a voter x′ with bribing the voter x′ and
then the non-voter x.
Proposition 4. Let V ⊆ C give rise to an evaluation eval,
let x ∈ C \ V , let x′ ∈ V , and let σ be an efficient strategy
such that σ(x) = b > 0, σ(x′) = b′ > 0, and σ(y) = 0, for
all y ∈ C \ {x, x′}. No matter whether we bribe x before x′
or x′ before x, the resulting revenue will be the same.
Propositions 3 and 4 show that, despite the fact that brib-
ing non-voters transforms the set of voters, we can ignore
the order of bribes when evaluating the effect of a strategy.
A (Non-Optimal) Greedy Algorithm
As strategies involving multiple customers can be decom-
posed by looking at strategies bribing a single one, which
can then be executed without attention to the order, a greedy
algorithm could be proposed to construct an optimal strat-
egy as follows. First, we select the customer who will yield
the highest revenue when bribed the maximal amount al-
lowed by the initial budget and their own evaluation. Note
that this could be either a voter or a non-voter. Then, repeat
the process until the initial budget is exhausted, or until all
individuals on the network who do not have maximal evalua-
tion yield a negative revenue when bribed. This simple idea,
which was shown to work when everyone votes (Grandi and
Turrini 2016), does not yield an optimal strategy, as the fol-
lowing example shows.
Example 2. Consider a 6-clique X of non-voters, each con-
nected to an associated voter with evaluation 12 as is de-
picted in Figure 1. The initial utility of the network is as
follows:
u0P =
∑
c∈C
P-rating(c, eval) =
∑
c∈X
1
2
+
∑
c∈C\X
1
2
= 6.
c1∗
c2
∗
c3
∗c4∗
c5
∗
c6∗
c70.5
c8
0.5
c9
0.5
c100.5
c11
0.5
c12
0.5
Figure 1: A network for which a greedy algorithm does not
yield an optimal bribing strategy. The numbers or ∗, above
or left of each node, indicate the initial evaluation of the cor-
responding customer.
Suppose that we bribe some clique customer x ∈ X its max-
imal amount. By Proposition 2, the revenue gain is:
=
∑
y∈N(x)
(
1
2
− 1
7
)
−
∑
y∈N(x)
(
1
2
∑
k∈N(y)∩V
1
2
)
=
3
4
.
Alternatively, suppose we bribe some non-clique customer
x ∈ C \ X its maximal amount 12 . The revenue gain from
doing so, by Proposition 1, is
1
2
[( ∑
y∈N(x)
1
νy
)
− 1
]
=
1
2
[( ∑
y∈N(x)
1
)
− 1
]
=
1
2
.
Since 34 >
1
2 , a greedy algorithm would first bribe a clique-
customer the amount 1.
Consider now any currently unbribed non-voter and the
pair it makes with the unique voter it is adjacent to, as is de-
picted in Figure 1 by the vertices coloured in gray. As long as
the non-voter remains unbribed, we can bribe the voter by 12
and gain an increase in revenue. Consequently, any greedy
algorithm must bribe at least one customer of the pair. This
is true for all five remaining such pairs. Therefore, the least
amount that a greedy algorithm bribes, from here on, is 12
per pair. The revenue produced by the bribing strategy com-
puted by a greedy algorithm is therefore:
rP(σ) ≤ 12− 6− 1− 5
2
=
5
2
.
This is due to the fact that the maximum utility of the net-
work after executing any strategy σ is 12 = |C|, the initial
utility of the network is 6, the amount 1 is spent on the first
bribe, and at least 12 is spent on bribing the remaining five
voter/non-voter pairs (we established that at least one cus-
tomer of each of these pairs must be bribed).
Consider the strategy σ′ of bribing all non-clique cus-
tomers fully. That is,
σ′(6)=σ′(7)=σ′(8)=σ′(9)=σ′(10)=σ′(11)=σ′(12)=
1
2
and σ′(x) = 0 for all other customers x. The revenue gained
by playing this strategy is
rP(σ
′) =
∑
c∈C
P-rating(c, eval)− u0P − 3 = 12− 6− 3 = 3
We therefore conclude that the greedy algorithm does not
compute an optimal bribing strategy.
While previous work has used a greedy approach to show
whether a system is manipulable by finding the optimal strat-
egy, this does not work for the general case. The question
now is whether we can find an optimal bribing strategy in
polynomial-time, or at least compute whether there exists a
successful manipulation strategy in polynomial-time, or, in-
stead, whether there might be a complexity-theoretic barrier
to doing so.
4 The Complexity of Bribery under the
P-rating
We now investigate, from a complexity theoretic standpoint,
the problem of computing a bribing strategy yielding at least
some given revenue, under our assumptions – when not ev-
ery customer votes and the restaurant has full knowledge
of each customer’s position. This, notice, will allow us to
determine the existence of both a successful manipulation
strategy, and an optimal strategy. Firstly we re-formulate the
above optimisation problem as a decision problem.
BRIBE-NVKL
Instance: Network (C,E), evaluation eval0, ρ ∈ Q
Yes-Instance: An instance of BRIBE-NVKL s.t. there
exists a strategy σ with r(σ) ≥ ρ
Any instance of the above problem should adhere to the
usual restrictions of the framework. These are, most impor-
tantly, that the initial evaluation is such that every customer
c ∈ C is adjacent to at least one customer c′ ∈ C such that
eval(c′) 6= ∗ (recall that every customer is adjacent to it-
self). Also, any strategy σ is such that
∑
c∈C σ(c) is at most
the initial utility resulting from eval0.
The following proposition is straightforward:
Proposition 5. BRIBE-NVKL is in NP.
Proof. Given a customer network (C,E), an evaluation
eval , and ρ ∈ Q, we can clearly decide whether a given
strategy σ yields a revenue of at least ρ in polynomial-time
(we simply evaluate the strategy). It therefore follows that
BRIBE-NVKL is in NP.
NP-hardness
In what follows, we show that BRIBE-NVKL is NP-hard,
by giving a reduction from the known NP-complete prob-
lem of finding an independent set on 3-regular graphs, aka
ISREG(3) (Garey and Johnson 1990).
Recall that a graph G is 3-regular if the degree of every
vertex is 3, and an independent set of G is a subset X of its
vertices such that there is no edge of G joining any pair of
vertices in X . We can now give the following definition:
ISREG(3)
Instance: A 3-regular graph G, k ∈ N
Yes-Instance: An instance of ISREG(3) such that G has
an independent set of size at least k
We can prove the following:
Proposition 6. BRIBE-NVKL is NP-hard.
Proof. We start by giving a reduction from an arbitrary in-
stance of ISREG(3) to an instance of BRIBE-NVKL. That
is, given a 3-regular graph G and k ∈ N, we construct a net-
work (C,E), an initial evaluation eval0, and ρ ∈ Q such
that G has an independent set of size at least k ⇐⇒ there
exists a strategy on ((C,E), eval0) that yields a revenue of
at least ρ. Given a 3-regular graph G, we define a network
of customers as follows:
Customers The set C of customers is composed of old,
pendant, and edge cutomers. For all vertices v ∈ G, we
create an old customer v ∈ C, as well as a set of pen-
dant customers v1, .., vn ∈ C, where n is the number of
vertices of G. For each edge (u, v) of G, we introduce an
edge customer wu,v ∈ C.
Network The network E relating customers is defined
as follows. For each old customer v, there is an edge
(v, vi) ∈ E for i = 1, 2, ..., n, connecting it to the re-
lated pendant customers. For every edge (u, v) of G, we
add (u,wu,v) and (wu,v, v) toE, relating the two old cus-
tomers with the corresponding edge customer.
x1
0
x2 0 x3
0
x4 0
x5
0
w12

w23

w24 
w15

x11 
x12

x1n 
...
x21

x22

x2n
. . .

x31

x32

x3n
...

x41

x42

x4n
. . .

x51

x52

x5n
...
Figure 2: The figure above shows a portion of a 3-regular
graphs, formed by the five black vertices (additional edges
required by 3-regularity have been omitted). Black vertices
are therefore old customers, white vertices are pendant cus-
tomers, and grey vertices are edge customers. The associated
bribing strategy is marked with 0, 1 and  labels.
For any such network as constructed above, we can define
an initial evaluation eval0 as follows, where 0 <  < 1 is
some value that will be set later in the proof:
• If c ∈ C is an old customer then eval0(c)=∗ (non-voter).
• If c ∈ C is an edge or pendant customer then eval0(c)=.
An example of the construction of the customer network
and evaluation from a graph G can be seen in Figure 2.
By the construction of the network, we have that for all
c ∈ C, the P-rating(c, eval0) =  (recall that we assumed
c ∈ N(c) for all customers). Every customer of the newly
constructed customer network contributes  to the initial util-
ity of the network and therefore u0P = (n + n
2 + 3n2 ). We
now choose  so that u0P = k; that is, so that
 =
k
n+ n2 + 3n2
.
By assumption the restaurant owner can only make bribes
totalling at most k. Furthermore, note that the initial evalu-
ation is a valid one in that every customer of the network is
adjacent to at least one voter. Finally, let
ρ = k(1− )
(
1
n+ 4
+
n+ 3
2
)
− k.
( =⇒ ) Suppose that our instance (G, k) of ISREG(3) is
a yes-instance; that is, there is a set I of k vertices such that
no two vertices of I are adjacent in G. Consider the bribing
strategy for (C,E) (as constructed above) where σ(c) = 1,
for every old customer corresponding to some vertex of I ,
and σ(c′) = 0 for all other c′ ∈ C.
Let us now compute the revenue obtained by σ. Recall
that the revenue is equal to the increase in P-rating of the
bribed customers and their neighbourhoods (old, pendant,
and edge customers), minus the cost of the bribe. The cumu-
lative increase in rating of bribed old customers is:
k
(
1 + (n+ 3)
n+ 4
− 
)
= k
1− 
n+ 4
.
The cumulative increase in rating of pendent customers is:
nk
(
1 + 
2
− 
)
= nk
1− 
2
.
Finally, the increase in rating due to edge customers is:
3k
(
1 + 
2
− 
)
= 3k
1− 
2
.
Recall that bribed old customers correspond to an indepen-
dent set in G. Summing up, the revenue of strategy σ is:
k(1− )
(
1
n+ 4
+
n+ 3
2
)
− k = ρ.
Therefore ((C,E), eval0, ρ) is a yes-instance of NVKL.
( ⇐= ) We now suppose that ((C,E), eval0, ρ) is a yes-
instance of NVKL and that σ is a bribing strategy that yields
a revenue of at least ρ. We will assume that σ is also opti-
mal, i.e., that there is no other strategy σ′ yielding a higher
revenue. We will now show that σ can be transformed into a
revenue-equivalent strategy such that (a) only old customers
are bribed, (b) all bribed old customers are bribed fully, and
(c) exactly k old customers are bribed.
We begin by showing the following technical lemma,
whose proof is omitted in the interest of space:
Lemma 7. Let σ be an optimal bribing strategy. Let X be
the set of customers for which eval(x) < evalσ(x) < 1. Let
vy = |N(y) ∩ V | for any y ∈ C. For x, y ∈ X∑
z∈N(x)
1
vz
=
∑
z∈N(y)
1
vz
.
So, given an optimal bribing strategy, we can move bribes
amongst non-fully bribed voters arbitrarily without affecting
the revenue acquired so long as we do not totally remove
all the bribe from a customer that was not originally a non-
voter, and we do not turn a non-voter into a voting one.
Revenue equivalent strategy - new customers. Let us
call new customers, the set of edge and pendant customers.
We begin by showing that σ can be modified into an optimal
strategy that does not bribe any new customer.
If a new customer is bribed then the bribes to new cus-
tomers can be enumerated in descending order as 1− , 1−
, ..., 1 − , 1, 2, ..., s, for some s ≥ 0 and where 0 <
i < 1−  for each i = 1, 2, ..., s, with possibly no bribe of
1 − . By Lemma 7, we can move bribes amongst the new
customers so that we may assume that all but at most one
new customer is not fully bribed; that is, that s ≤ 1. The
following result is needed:
Lemma 8. There exists an old customer c′ who has not been
bribed and where at most one of its adjacent new pendant
customers has been bribed.
First, we suppose that there exists a fully bribed new cus-
tomer, and derive a contradiction with the optimality of σ.
Consider the bribe of 1−  to c, and consider the increase
in P-rating generated by this single bribe. If c is a new
pendant customer then this contribution is certainly less than
2 as |N(c)| = 2, and if c is a new edge customer then this
contribution is less than 3 as |N(c)| = 3. Therefore, in all
cases, the bribe of 1 −  to c contributes less than 3 units to
the overall utility accrued from σ.
By Lemma 8, let c′ be an old customer that is not bribed
and that is adjacent to at most one new pendant customer that
has been bribed. Consider moving the 1 −  bribe from c to
c′; so, we obtain a new (efficient) strategy σ′. Let us examine
the increase in P-rating generated by this new 1−  bribe.
At least n − 1 of the new pendant customers adjacent to
c′ have not been bribed and so the associated cumulative
increase in rating is given by (n− 1) 12 − (n− 1) and given
that  ≤ 22n+5 then the cumulative increase in utility is
(n− 1)
(
1
2
− 
)
>
n− 1
2
− 1.
Bribing c′ might reduce the P-ratings of c′ and its adjacent
new edge customers. However, this reduction is certainly
less than 4 units. Therefore we may conclude that the move-
ment of 1− of bribe from c to c′ increases the overall utility
by an amount greater than
(
n−1
2 − 1
)−7 units. This amount
is strictly positive for n sufficiently large (n ≥ 14). There-
fore the strategy σ′ that we have constructed yields a revenue
greater than that of σ, in contradiction with its optimality.
Suppose now that some new customer c has been bribed
some amount δ such that 0 < δ < 1 − . By a detailed
case study – omitted for space constraints – we can again
derive a contradiction with the optimality of σ. Therefore,
we conclude that no new customer have been bribed in the
revenue-equivalent optimal strategy σ.
Revenue equivalent strategy - old customers. We now
turn our attention to old customers. The bribes on old
customers can be enumerated in descending order as
1, 1, ..., 1, δ1, δ2, ..., δm, for some m ≥ 0 and where 0 <
δi < 1, for each i = 1, 2, ...,m, with possibly no bribes of 1.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that
∑m
i=1 δi ≤
1; otherwise, we would have that m ≥ 2 and we could re-
duce the bribes δ2, δ3, ..., δm, without making any equal to
zero, so as to increase the bribe δ1 to 1 and secure another
fully bribed customer. The following result is needed:
Lemma 9. Let (C,E) be some network with initial evalua-
tion eval0 and let σ be a bribing strategy. Let c ∈ C be such
that eval0(c) 6= ∗ and evalσ(c) = δ > 0, but where for
every customer c′′ ∈ ⋃{N(c′) : c′ ∈ N(c)}, we have that
δ < evalσ(c′′). If σ−c is the bribing strategy obtained from
σ by removing the bribe from c, we have that r(σ−c) ≥ r(σ).
Therefore, we can assume that at most one old customer
has not been fully bribed.
Suppose now that there is in fact one bribed old cus-
tomer that has not been fully bribed. Let us call this old cus-
tomer c and further suppose that it has been bribed δ where
0 < δ < 1. We will again show that this yields yet another
contradiction with the optimality of σ. We have the capac-
ity to increase this bribe to 1 at a cost of 1 − δ (which we
can do, given the remaining resource). The P-rating of all
the customers withinN(c) will increase with the cumulative
increase (only due to new pendant neighbours) being
n
1 + 
2
− nδ + 
2
= n
1− δ
2
.
Hence we obtain an increase in revenue for n sufficiently
large (n ≥ 3). This contradicts the optimality of σ. Hence-
forth, we assume that, without loss of generality, any optimal
bribing strategy σ on (C,E), with initial evaluation eval0,
is necessarily such that only old customers are bribed and
bribed old customers are fully bribed.
Suppose now that the bribing strategy σ bribes less than
k old customers; so, there is an old customer c that has not
been bribed. Let us amend σ to obtain a new bribing strategy
σ′ by bribing c so that σ(c) = 1. This costs us 1 unit of
resource. There is no customer of C such that its P-rating
decreases, and the cumulative increase in P-rating of the n
new pendant customers adjacent to c is
n
(
1 + 
2
− 
)
= n
(
1− 
2
)
>
n(2n+ 3)
2(2n+ 5)
>
n
4
which is strictly greater than 1 (the amount invested) for n
sufficiently large (n ≥ 5). This contradicts the optimality of
σ. Furthermore, it is clear that more than k old customers
could not have been bribed since the initial utility of the net-
work totals only k and each old customer is bribed by 1.
Finding an independent set of size k. We have shown
above that the optimal bribing strategy σ on (C,E) is such
that only old customers are bribed, all bribed old customers
are fully bribed, and exactly k old customers are bribed.
Consider now the revenue accruing from our optimal brib-
ing strategy σ. Irrespective of which k old customers are
fully-bribed, the increase in P-rating due to these old cus-
tomers is equal to:
(1 + (n+ 3))
n+ 4
−  = 1− 
n+ 4
,
and the P-rating of the pendant customers adjacent to each
of these bribed old customers increases by:
1 + 
2
−  = 1− 
2
.
All that remains is to compute the revenue accruing due to
the new edge customers adjacent to each of these bribed old
customers (as the P-rating of any other old or new cus-
tomer does not change). However, this depends upon how
many bribed old customers each new edge customer is ad-
jacent to. Let mi denote the number of new edge customers
adjacent to i bribed old customers, for i = 1, 2. If a new
edge customer c is adjacent to 1 bribed old customer then its
increase in P-rating is
(1 + )
2
−  = (1− )
2
and if it is adjacent to two bribed old customers then its in-
crease in P-rating is
(2 + )
3
−  = 2(1− )
3
.
So, the total increase in revenue is
m1
(1− )
2
+m2
2(1− )
3
.
We also know that by counting the edges joining bribed old
customers and their adjacent new edge customers, we obtain
that 3k = 2m2 +m1. Hence, the total increase in P-rating
due to new edge customers is equal to
m1
(1− )
2
+m2
2(1− )
3
= (3k − 2m2) (1− )
2
+m2
2(1− )
3
=
3k(1− )
2
−m2 (1− )
3
.
So, the revenue due to the bribing strategy σ is:
k(1− )
n+ 4
+
nk(1− )
2
+
3k(1− )
2
−m2 (1− )
3
− k
= (1− )[ k
n+ 4
+
k(n+ 3)
2
− m2
3
]− k.
Clearly this revenue is largest when m2 is 0, and if m2 > 0
then the revenue is less than this maximal value. Also, when
m2 is 0 this revenue is exactly equal to ρ. Hence, as we
started with a yes-instance of NVKL, we must have that
m2 = 0, i.e., that no edge customer is adjacent to two bribed
old customers. Thus, the k vertices of G corresponding to
the k bribed old customers in C form an independent set,
and (G, k) is a yes-instance of ISREG(3).
As a direct consequence of Propositions 5 and 6 we obtain
the following:
Theorem 10. BRIBE-NVKL is NP-complete.
In summary, we have been able to prove the NP-
completeness of BRIBE-NVKL by giving a reduction from
ISREG(3). This is an important finding, that significantly
strengthens the value of personalised rating systems and
their resistance to bribery, as we have demonstrated that we
cannot compute an optimal bribing strategy, nor any strategy
guaranteeing at least a given reward, in a reasonable amount
of time; that is, of course, unless P = NP.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated the problem of manipulation in a
network-based rating system, in which customers’ form
their personalised rating aggregating the opinion of their
peers and an external attacker is allowed to elaborate brib-
ing strategies to modify them. The framework, first elabo-
rated by Grandi and Turrini (2016), has been shown to be
manipulable when the attacker has full knowledge of the un-
derlying network. In this paper we have shown that despite
this fact, manipulation is intractable in practice, as the prob-
lem of computing the existence of a manipulation strategy
guaranteeing a given reward and thus an optimal one, what
we called BRIBE-NVKL, is NP-complete. This, we find,
is a major strengthening for the practical applicability of the
personalised rating framework.
However, it has to be emphasised that our results are con-
fined to worst-case complexity analysis and it is therefore
necessary to analyse alternative methods for manipulation.
These include studying the parameterised complexity of
various sub-problems (see, e.g., Faliszewski and Nieder-
meier, 2014). Alternatively, we can think of devising ways to
compute an approximate or satisfactory solution that yields
at least a positive return. More specifically, we may still be
able to salvage something of the P-greedy approach from
Grandi and Turrini (2016). We saw through our Example 2
that whilst not yielding the optimal amount of revenue, we
can still compute a profitable return. We can approach this
question from a slightly less formal but nevertheless impor-
tant angle and seek to obtain a number of experimental re-
sults concerning the performance of greedy algorithms.
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